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POINT  AND LINE  VULNERABILITY  AS BASES FOR 
PREDICTING  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF POWER IN 
EXCHANGE  NETWORKS:  REPLY  TO WILLER' 
David Willer's  comment  on our 1983  AJS article  provides  us with  a 
useful  opportunity  to  describe  the  progress  that  we  have  made  in  refining 
the  measure  of  vulnerability  introduced  in  that  article.  To place  Willer's 
commentary  in perspective,  the  primary  purpose  of  our article  was to 
present  the results  of an experiment  and of computer  simulations  on 
network  centrality  and its  relation  to  power  in  exchange  networks.  Wil- 
ler's  comment  does not  deal with  these  findings.  At  the  very  end  of  the 
article,  we proposed-as a preliminary  notion-the idea  that  vulnerabil- 
ity  might  be a useful  theoretical  concept  (see p. 299),  and we suggested 
point  vulnerability  as one potential  technique  or measurement  tool  for 
determining  points  of minimum  dependence  in networks.  Such points 
would  thus  be the  most  powerful  network  locations  according  to  power- 
dependence  theory. 
Willer's  main  criticism  is  that  our  measure  of  vulnerability,  Reduction 
in Maximum  Flow (RMF), is not  generalizable  across  all types  of  net- 
works.  On this  point  he is quite correct.  In fact,  we clearly  noted  this 
limitation  (see  p. 301,  n. 21). We introduced  the  RMF measure  merely  as 
an illustration  of  the  theoretical  potential  of  the  notion  of  vulnerability, 
not  as a refined  procedure  for  use  in  empirical  research.  We thought  that 
we had made  this  clear.  For example,  on page 299  we stated,  "Ourfirst 
step  toward  a theoretical  solution  . .. was prompted  by  the.  ..  concept  of 
'vulnerability'  " (emphasis  added). 
Although  Willer  takes  us to  task  for  not  developing  a better  measure, 
he does not propose  an alternative.  Subsequent  to publication  of our 
experimental  results,  we  continued  to  work  on  this  measurement  problem 
and to  explore  the  limitations  of  our  preliminary  measure.  In this  work 
we explored  the  use  of  both  point  and  line  vulnerability  as the  basis  for  a 
more  general  measure.  The task  that  we  set  for  ourselves  was  to  develop  a 
more  comprehensive  measure.  We  will  briefly  describe  our  proposed  solu- 
tion  (more  details  are available from  us in  a technical  report). 
The simplest  network  in  which  our  original  RMF measure  of  vulnera- 
bility  fails  to  predict  the  distribution  of  power  is  the  four-person  network 
shown  in  figure  1. In this  network,  all points  are  predicted  by  the  RMF 
measure  to  be  of  equal power.  However,  simulation  results  show  that  A is 
1  The authors' names are listed alphabetically. This work was funded  by National 
Science Foundation grant  no. Soc 78-25788. We acknowledge  our  intellectual  debt  to 
the  late Richard M.  Emerson, coauthor  of  the  article  that  appeared in the  American 
Journal  of  Sociology  in 1983. 
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FIG.  1.-Four-person exchange  network 
more  powerful  than  B (A's average  profit  was 65% of  the  total  available 
profit).  To  overcome  this limitation  in the original  measure,  we in- 
troduced  the  notion  of  the  cost  of  exercising  power.  The RMF rmeasure 
proposed  in the 1983 article  is based on the  graph-theoretic  notion  of 
point  vulnerability,  the  notion  that  the  complete  removal  of  an  actor  from 
a network  can result  in  a certain  loss  or  reduction  in  the  level  of  resource 
exchange  throughout  the  entire  network.  An  actor  can  impose  a resource 
loss  on  the  network  by  isolating  himself  or  herself  from  the  network,  but 
this  act is quite costly  to the  actor.  If the  actor  can produce  the  same 
amount  of resource  loss without  isolating  himself  completely  from  the 
network  (and thus  keeping  open opportunities  to exchange  with  some 
actors),  the  cost  of  exercising  power  is  greatly  reduced  for  that  actor.  This 
can be accomplished  by  an actor's  closing  off  some  exchange  opportuni- 
ties  rather  than  removing  himself  from  the  network.  For example,  Al in 
figure  1  can reduce  the  maximum  flow  of  resources  to  24  units  simply  by 
closing  off  the  opportunity  to exchange  with  B, while  keeping  open  the 
opportunity  to exchange  with  A2. In contrast,  B, must  isolate  himself 
completely  from  the  network  in order  to reduce  the  maximum  flow  of 
resources  to  24 units. 
This type  of reasoning  led us to the graph-theoretic  notion  of line 
vulnerability  (see Cook, Gillmore,  and Yamagishi 1984).  A network  is 
vulnerable  at a line  if  removal  of  that  line  (or  exchange  relation)  reduces 
resource  flow  throughout  the  network.  Point  vulnerability  determines  the 
absolute  maximum  power  potential  for  each position  in a network,  and 
line  vulnerability  determines  the  cost  of  exercising  structural  power.  The 
cost  may be defined  as a reduction  in the potential  for  gaining  profit 
owing  to the removal  of lines (or exchange  opportunities)  in order  to 
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exercise  power  at its  potential.  As a first  approximation  of  the  cost  mea- 
sure,  we devised  a measure  that  we refer  to  as CRMF: 
CRMFi  = No. of  lines  that  need  to  be removed  to  exercise  power  at  its  potential 
lRMF, 
= 
Total no. of  lines  connected  to  point  i 
We know  that  this  is not  a very  good approximation,  since  lines  that 
represent  exchange  opportunities  differ  in importance.  Some exchange 
opportunities  are more  important  than  others  and are thus  used more 
often.  Ultimately,  we would  like  to  weight  the  lines  by  their  importance 
in  calculating  the  CRMF measure.  However,  even  this  approximation  is 
sufficient  to  solve  the  problem  raised  by  Willer.  In the  network  in  figure 
1,  CRMF for  A is one-half,  and for  B it  is one. This  measure  is relevant 
only  when RMF  is not zero. Thus we arrived  at a new measure  of 
network-wide  dependence,  DNi,  based on the  concepts  of  point  and line 
vulnerability: 
DNi=  RMFi x (1 -  CRMFj). 
This  measure  of  DNi should  not  be  interpreted  as an exact  formulation  of 
network-wide  dependence  in exchange  networks;  rather,  it  simply  indi- 
cates  the  direction  in which  our  work  on this  issue  is heading. 
According  to this  measure,  B2 in Willer's  figure  2 is predicted  to be 
most  powerful,  followed  by  BI, and finally  by  A1,  A2,  and  A3.  It will  be 
easy  for  the  reader  to  apply  this  measure  to  derive  predictions  of  differen- 
tial  power  among  A, B, and  C in  Willer's  figure  3. We  examined,  through 
a series  of  computer  simulations,  a number  of  networks  in which  the 
original  RMF measure  was not  successful  in  predicting  the  distribution  of 
power  (some  of  which  are similar  to  the  cases identified  by  Willer),  and 
the  simulation  results  repeatedly  supported  the  predictions  based  on the 
revised  measure.  Thus it  appears  to  be a measure  superior  to  the  one  we 
introduced  in 1983. 
Willer  also claims  in  several  places  that  our  measure  leads  us to  "logi- 
cally  impossible"  inferences.  While  we are  not  defending  our  preliminary 
measure,  it  is important  to  understand  the  underlying  theoretical  point. 
Willer  claims,  for  example,  that  "if  A is  exercising  power  over  B, then  B 
cannot  be exercising  power  over  A" (emphasis  added). This is simply 
wrong  from  a power-dependence  perspective.  Emerson  first  discussed 
this issue in his 1962 article:  "The notion  of reciprocity  in power- 
dependence  relations  raises  the  question  of  equality  or  inequality  of  power 
in the  relation.  If the  power  of  A over  B . . . is confronted  by equal 
opposing  power  of  B over  A, is power  then  neutralized  or  cancelled  out? 
We suggest  that  in such  a balanced condition,  power  is in no way re- 
moved  from  the  relationship"  (1962,  pp. 33-34). If ai  social  relationship 
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exists  because  each  actor  is  more  or  less  dependent  on  the  other,  then  each 
has some  power  in  that  relationship  no matter  how  unequal  it  may  be. 
We hope  that  this  response  clears  up any  misunderstanding  about  our 
intentions  in presenting  the RMF measure  in its early  and unrefined 
stage.  Clearly  more  empirical  work  is needed  on  this  and other  measures 
currently  being  developed.  Bonacich  (1985), for  example,  has recently 
proposed  a measure  that appears quite promising.  Perhaps our "ex- 
change"  with  Willer  will  serve  as a stimulus  to  more  work  on this  ques- 
tion. 
KAREN S. COOK 
MARY R. GILLMORE 
TOSHIO  YAMAGISHI 
University  of  Washington 
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